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Consumer Heterogeneity and the Impact of Trade Liberalization:




While it is well established that across-country taste diﬀerences are associated with "home
market eﬀects", there is very limited analysis of how such preference heterogeneity impacts
the aggregate volume of trade and the welfare gains from liberalization. I develop a structural
model of aggregate demand featuring products with heterogeneous attributes, consumers with
heterogeneous tastes for attributes, and across-country diﬀerences in the distribution of tastes.
The impact of across-country taste diﬀerences depends on whether the domestic industry can
adjust to the mismatch between the attribute composition of imports and the domestic distri-
bution of tastes. For the case of a large degree of across-country taste diﬀerences, countries
specialize completely and the model supports notions along the lines of Linder (1961) that
taste diversity impedes the volume of trade and leads to group-specic gains from trade. In
contrast, if specialization is incomplete, free rm entry implies that the relative toughness of
competition across diﬀerent market segments must be invariant to liberalization. It is shown
that therefore, both trade volume and welfare gains are entirely unaﬀected by the distribution
of foreign tastes and coincide with those in a representative agent framework.
Keywords: Intra-Industry Trade, Monopolistic Competition, Heterogeneous Agents, Industrial
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Starting with Krugman (1979) and Lancaster (1980), international trade theory has over-
whelmingly been based on increasing returns and monopolistic competition. The property that
distinguishes this "new" trade theory most clearly from supply-sided motives for trade is the
"home market eﬀect" of Krugman (1980) relating across-country diﬀerences in the distribution of
consumer tastes to bilateral net trade ows.1
While there now exists ample empirical evidence for the home market eﬀect and thus also
for the existence of across-country taste heterogeneity (Davis and Weinstein (1999 and 2003),
Feenstra et al. (2001), Head and Ries (2001), Weder (2003), Hanson and Xiang (2004), Crozet and
Trionfetti (2008), and Brülhart and Trionfetti (2009)), most analysis in the theory of international
trade is based upon preference frameworks that assume the existence of a globally representative
consumer. This discrepancy is even more striking against the backdrop of recent empirical studies
nding direct evidence against the notion that consumers can be typied by such a representative
agent (Bills and Klenow (2001), Atkin (2009), and Broda and Romalis (2009)).
What is the relevant metric for the gains from trade when consumers have heterogeneous
tastes? How do across-country diﬀerences in the distribution of tastes impact the volume of trade
and the welfare gains from liberalization? In this paper, I demonstrate that, owing to the way in
which the domestic industrial composition adjusts to trade, the eﬀects of trade liberalization in
a structural model of across-country demand heterogeneity may actually coincide with those in a
representative agent framework.
The basic preference framework, presented in section 1, is one in which consumers are het-
erogeneous in their valuation of attributes, goods are heterogeneous in the level of the attribute
they deliver, and in equilibrium, good attributes and consumer valuations tend to be matched as-
sortively. A key assumption of the model is that rms can decide with what kind of good to enter
the market and that therefore, attribute-entry is directed towards the distribution of consumer
tastes.2
Section 3 nests these preferences in a model of the international economy featuring iceberg
transportation costs and two countries that diﬀer in the distribution of consumer valuations.
The model comprises the standard representative agent framework of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)
as a special case, thus allowing to directly evaluate the impact of taste heterogeneity on trade
ows, industrial composition dynamics, and the welfare gains from trade. The latter impact
is shown to depend crucially on the degree to which the domestic industry composition can
adjust to counteract the mismatch between the attribute composition of imports and the domestic
distribution of tastes, i.e. on whether countries are completely specialized or not.
For the case of incomplete specialization, I nd that the class of increasing returns models
with constant markups gives rise to a result on the invariance of relative ideal price indices to
trade that is akin to the factor price equalization theorem in the classical theory of trade. In
the latter constant returns economy analyzed by Samuelson (1949), costless trade equates good
prices and any equilibrium featuring incomplete specialization requires that factors of production
receive exactly the same reward across countries. In the increasing returns economy analyzed
1This home market eﬀect within the manufacturing sector is not to be confused with the home market eﬀect
analyzed in Krugman (1991), where sectors diﬀer in their returns to scale and transportation costs, large countries
specialize into the increasing returns manufacturing sector, and smaller nations specialize into the constant returns
agricultural sector.
2This paper analyses the case where consumers are characterized by heterogeneous preference parameters over
good attributes and homothetic preferences. Countries may also choose diﬀerent consumption bundles in the
presence of a representative agent with non-homothetic preferences and income heterogeneity (see Foellmi et al.
(2008), Fieler (2009), and Fajgelbaum et al (2009)).
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in this paper, the adjustment of rm prots is attained via relative rm scale. Irrespective of
whether markets are open or not, the free rm "attribute-entry” condition requires that the set
of competitors (adjusted for trade costs) producing a certain type of good is proportional to the
number of consumers with a preference for the type of good in question. It is then shown that
the interplay of the free attribute-entry conditions at Home and in Foreign requires that with
symmetric trade costs, the domestic industry structure must adjust such as to exactly counteract
the mismatch between the attribute composition of imports and the domestic distribution of
tastes, in turn leaving the relative "toughness" of competition — summarized by ideal price indices
— unaﬀected by trade.
A major implication of this nding is that the recent quantications of the gains from trade
based on the representative agent framework (see Broda and Weinstein (2004), Broda et al.
(2006), and Akorlakis et al. (2008)), hold exactly even if the representative agent is actually not
the correct description of the underlying consumption decisions. For example, if there are two
goods wine and beer, assume that the French population consists mostly of wine lovers, while
the opposite is true for Germany. German exports are then too "beer-intensive" for the typical
French consumer, but this is oﬀset by the French industry specializing into the wine segment. On
the consumer side, this implies that while the group of French beer lovers gains relatively more
from the imported German varieties, the domestic industry responses favors French wine lovers.
In equilibrium these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other and all consumers benet from trade
in the same proportion irrespective of the distribution of tastes abroad and in the exact same
proportion as in the large class of representative agent models surveyed in Akorlakis et al. (2009).
Second, this nding also reemphasizes the challenge that trade theory faces in reconciling
the observed volume of trade with measured trade costs (see, for example, Anderson and Van
Wincoop (2003) and the literature on the "missing globalization puzzle"). Starting with Linder
(1961) and Armington (1969), there is ample informal notion in the literature that diﬀerences
between theoretical predictions and empirical estimates of trade volume can be explained by
unmeasured across-country diﬀerences in consumer tastes. These notions disregard the fact that
demand for imports is not determined by preferences alone, but also, by how well these preferences
are served by the domestic industry. With trade, the home market eﬀect implies that a lower
domestic valuation for an attribute is associated with an over-proportional reduction in domestic
production of goods embodying the attribute and the equilibrium therefore features a high import
volume of goods that are in low demand. Overall, this implies that the aggregate volume of trade
is equal to the level one would observe in a representative agent economy.
Taste heterogeneity can matter for trade if the degree of across-country taste diﬀerences is
large so that both countries are completely specialized (each in a diﬀerent sector). In the above
introduced example, Germany then exports only beer, for which demand in France is so low that
even in the absence of any French beer producer there is still little demand for beer; German
exports are thus not "appropriate" for the tastes of the average French consumer. Then, across-
country taste diﬀerences are associated with a "consumption home-bias" in the Armington (1969)
sense that the volume of trade is lower than what would be expected on the basis of transportation
costs and the elasticity of demand and the model conrms Linder’s (1961, p. 94) conjecture that
"[t]he more similar is the demand structure of two countries, the more intensive, potentially, is
the trade between these two countries."
Is complete specialization a relevant case? The pervasiveness of zero trade ows (see the survey
in Helpman et al. (2008)) suggests that at least in some industries, some countries are completely
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specialized.3 It is noteworthy, however, that the analysis also implies that taste heterogeneity may
matter only little for the eﬀect of liberalization even if specialization is complete. For example, if
parameters are such that specialization is complete but only marginally so, the volume of trade
and the welfare gains from trade are still equal to the one prevailing in a representative agent
framework.
Before concluding, I show that also a small degree of across-country taste diﬀerences can aﬀect
the volume of and the gains from trade in the transition from autarky to liberalization if industry
composition reacts with a lag to liberalization. In section 5, I show in a extension of the model
that in the short run after liberalization, the welfare gains from trade occur disproportionately to
the comparatively smaller group of consumers, since this group gains access to a comparatively
large set of new imported varieties. Moreover, in the short run after liberalization, diﬀerences in
the distributions of tastes across countries are associated with lower trade volume. In autarky,
the composition of the domestic industry adjusts to the distribution of consumer valuations such
that all rms have equal sales. Second, in the presence of across-country taste diﬀerences, the
foreign industry is not composed proportional to the home distribution of tastes and consequently,
imports tend to increase the toughness of competition more in some segments than in others.
Third, because foreign rms tend to concentrate in precisely the relatively tough market segment
(in fact: in the segment they make tough by their exports), their sales are low compared to the
domestic rms. Thus, across-country taste diﬀerences diminish the short run volume of trade if
the exporter’s industry is non-negligible in size.
The structure of this paper is the following. Section 1 develops the preferences and section 2
analyzes the equilibrium of the closed economy. In next open markets to trade and analyze the
impact of trade liberalization between two symmetric countries in section 3. These results are
next generalized in section 4 to the case of asymmetric entry costs in the two industry segments,
asymmetric preference parameters, and also, to the case of asymmetric countries that trade with
the rest of the world. The static impact of liberalization is analyzed in section 5 and section 6
concludes.
1 A Model of the Demand for Heterogeneous Products
In this section, I develop a model of consumer preferences combining two motives of consumption
decisions: the love of variety motive from Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and the two-sided hetero-
geneity of good attributes  and consumer valuations  in the spirit of Mussa and Rosen (1978).
Consumers with a high taste for an attribute tend to buy from rms with a high-attribute good.
The key implication of this assortative matching is that rms with similar goods tend to sell
to consumers with similar tastes, i.e., that the industry is endogenously segmented by product
attributes. Consequently, with trade, the composition of imports matters for the composition of
the domestic industry.
Diﬀerences in attributes  can be seen as diﬀerences in good quality, but may also reect more
trivial product characteristics such as the good’s color or the language used to label a product.
Similarly, diﬀerences in valuations  reect diﬀerences in people’s tastes for the attribute. For
example, some consumers might have a preference for cars painted in Ferrari Red, while others
prefer British Racing Green.
3Indeed, Bernasconi (2009) nds evidence that the degree of country similarity is a predictor for zero trade ows
while Hallak (forthcoming) nds empirical support for the Linder hypothesis along the intensive margin.
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Consumers also value variety, i.e., they prefer an economy featuring many diﬀerent varieties of
cars painted in British Racing Green to an economy featuring only one such variety. This love for
variety motive is derived from a discrete choice setting in the spirit of McFadden (1981), Anderson
et. al. (1987 and 1992), and Gabaix et al. (2009). Each consumer is endowed with consumer-rm
specic utility draws . Since having a larger number of such draws raises the expected maximum
draw, consumer welfare rises with the number of available varieties.
I next lay out the functional forms used in this paper to model these intuitions, derive a rm’s
demand, and then describe the supply side of the economy.
1.1 Preferences
The world is composed of two countries named Home and Foreign, which are populated by a
mass of  and ∗ consumers respectively. Each consumer has preferences over a homogenous
O (outside) good and over a nite set of diﬀerentiated M (manufacturing) varieties. Each M
rm produces exactly one diﬀerentiated variety that is characterized by its attribute . Each
consumer has a valuation  for the attribute  and is also characterized by an idiosyncratic and
consumer-rm specic utility draw .
Throughout the analysis, let  index consumers (individuals) and  index manufacturing
rms. Each consumer  is endowed with income  = 4 in terms of labor and a valuation draw
. Each consumer is also endowed with a consumer-rm specic draw  for each rm in .
Consumers care about the valuation- and idiosyncratic draw- adjusted eﬀective quantity of the
manufacturing M good and the absolute quantity of the outside good . Denoting the quantity
consumer  consumes of the  good by  and the quantity she consumes from manufacturing

















 ≤ . (2)
The utility function (1) implies that for all consumers, all manufacturing goods are perfectly
substitutable. However, diﬀerent consumers have diﬀerent rates of substitution between diﬀerent
varieties; in equilibrium, therefore, certain types of consumers are more or less likely to buy certain
types of goods.
Consider rst only the term  in (1).5 The key feature of this term in the preferences is
that the rate at which consumers value (or dislike) the attribute diﬀers between consumers with
diﬀerent . Assume that two otherwise identical consumers of valuations  and    are
oﬀered to buy a certain good  at price  or a good  at price  where   . What
4The preferences of the model developed below are homothetic so that the model’s predictions with  equal
workers who supply  units of eﬀective labor each are exactly equal to the predictions in a model with heterogeneous




5Both  and  are a scalars. It is straightforward to extend the model at hand to the case of multiple
attributes. For example, if each consumer is characterized by independent valuations over  attribute dimensions,
the predictions developed below continue to hold exactly.
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is the maximum price diﬀerence between  and  at which each consumer would prefer the
high  good? For the  −  consumer, this would be price ratio  = (−),
while it would be  = (−) for the − consumer. Because higher valuation
consumers value the attribute more, in equilibrium, they constitute the relatively larger group
of consumers of  −  goods. For expositional clarity, a large part of the analysis below
assumes that  can take only one of two possible values (). However, in general, this
assumption is not necessary to derive a rm’s demand and valuations can take any positive value,
i.e.,
 ∼  () where  () ≥ 0 (3)
Next, consider only the term  in (1).  is a consumer-rm specic shock, reecting the
fact that some consumers like or dislike the variety of a specic rm irrespective of the variety’s
attribute. In (1), the idiosyncratic taste shock introduces market power to the model: although
rms cannot observe , they can engage in rst degree price discrimination by charging a higher
price and only attracting consumers with high  draws. Throughout the analysis, I assume that
 is distributed maximum Gumbel (or Type I extreme value distribution ) with scale and shape
parameters 0 and 1 respectively.
 () = exp[−exp[−]] (4)
The consumer-rm specic shocks are orthogonal to rm attribute or consumer valuation and are
independent across rms and consumers:  ⊥  for  6= . Gabaix et al. (2006 and 2009)
demonstrate that these assumptions, in combination with a utility function similar to (1) yield an
ideal-variety micro foundation for the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) demand system of
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). It is note worthy that the closed-form assumption on the consumer-rm
specic taste shocks (4) is not very restrictive, since in equilibrium consumers buy only from the
attribute-adjusted maximum realization of . Since the economy features a large number of
rms, the distribution of this maxima converges to the Type I extreme value distribution for a
wide set of underlying distributions.6
1.2 Demand and Consumer Welfare
I next solve for a rm’s demand and consumer welfare using the general distribution of valuations
 (). Consumer  consumes the agricultural O good and the manufacturing composite  ≡ P

+. Before considering the choice among the single manufactured goods, consider
rst the decision of how much of the O good to consume. The rst order conditions of the utility
function (1) with respect to these two quantities and the budget constraint (2) imply that an
agent with income 1 consumes
 = (1 − )/ and  = / 
where  is the price of the manufacturing composite for consumer  (which is NOT the same
for all ). Irrespective of this price, the consumer always spends a fraction  of her income on the
O good.
6The preference structure at hand makes the model’s results highly comparable to the work of Bernard et al.
(2003), who extend the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of trade to allow for positive markups. In Bernard et
al. the realization of productivities is common knowledge and rms thus engage in Bertrand competition. In the
framework developed here, rms only know the distribution of taste shocks and, therefore, engage in rst degree
price discrimination.
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Thus, the consumer spends the remainder fraction of (1 − ) on the manufacturing composite.
Within the manufacturing composite, since all goods are perfect substitutes, each consumer then
chooses the variety that yields the highest ratio of eﬀective quantity per unit divided by the price
of the variety. Since consumers with diﬀerent valuation  diﬀer in their average rate at which
they substitute goods of diﬀerent attributes a, demand is of a diﬀerent shape for each .
Proposition 1 (Demand) The demand () of a rm with attribute  and price  is
equal to









where Γ() is the beta function and  () denotes the ideal price index for all consumers with











The proof of Proposition 1 follows previous research demonstrating how the love of variety
motive can arise in a discrete choice setting: each consumer has a consumer-variety specic taste
shock . For equal prizes and good attributes, the consumer chooses the maximum of all the
realizations of the taste shocks , i.e., she chooses  = argmax

. Owing to the functional
form assumption that the idiosyncratic taste shocks are distributed Gumbel with shape parameter
1, all rms face a constant elasticity of demand equal to −(1 + ).
Compared to the existing literature, the novel ingredient in the derivation of rm demand (5)
is that the probability of consumer  with valuation  =  buying from rm  with attribute
 =  depends on the match of  and , as well as on how well the other goods in the economy
match with the consumer’s taste, i.e., the ideal price index of consumers with  = . First, sales
are shifted by the match between the consumer’s valuation and the rm’s attribute, i.e., in (5),
demand is shifted by exp[]. Second, it is not only the match between rm  and consumer
 with  =  that determines sales, but also how well the competition’s output matches with the
consumers preferences, i.e., the ideal price index of each consumer valuation is a function of the
attribute composition of the economy. The latter average match is summarized in the ideal price
index  ().
Since sales to each consumer are inversely proportional to  ()
−
, I will below refer to  ()
−
as a measure of the "toughness" of competition for consumers of this type.
Last, there is not one type of consumer, but a distribution of consumers with varying valua-
tions. Total demand for a rm is equal to the sum of demand from all possible valuations, hence
explaining the outer integral over the possible realizations of  in (5).
Since the expected maximum draw is increasing in the number of draws, consumers prefer
having a larger number of varieties to choose from, i.e., they love variety. A key feature of the
preferences developed here is that consumer welfare is highly comparable to the one in Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977).
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Corollary 1 (Consumer Welfare) Denote the expected welfare of consumer  with  =  and
income  by  ( ()). If  = 1,










where the ideal price index  () is as dened in (6) and Γ() is the gamma function.
Proof. see Appendix
Corollary 1 documents an important property of the developed preference structure. Changes
in the toughness of competition for consumers with  =  can be mapped directly into welfare
changes for this group of consumers. As I document below, with open markets, the interplay of the
free entry conditions at Home and abroad pins down the ideal relative price indices for diﬀerent
v’s uniquely, hence leading to very sharp predictions regarding the welfare eﬀects of trade.
Moreover, one can directly relate the ndings of this paper to the existing literature. In the
case where all rms produce the same good ( =  = ), the valuation-attribute match in (5)
cancels out and the demand curve is the same as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The model at hand,
therefore, is a generalization of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) framework.
Another special case is where there are two goods    and the degree of taste het-
erogeneity is extreme such that consumers buy only one type of good: exp[] ≈ 0 and
exp[] ≈ 0. In this case, the economy resembles that of Krugman (1980).
1.3 Supply
For expositional clarity, I restrict the universe of potential levels the attribute can take and assume
that {}, where 0    . I refer to the two attribute levels as the  −  or
 −  "good", "rm", or "variety" in the remainder of the paper.
In each country and at each moment in time, a large set of potential entrepreneurs can enter
the M industry by paying a xed ow cost of [;] labor units. Each entrepreneur can
leave the industry at any point of time.
While alive, each rm can produce any quantity of its good at constant marginal costs (in
units of labor) equal to
 =  (7)
()
 can be positive, zero, or negative. For example, if  measures the wavelength of the good’s
color, it may be cheaper to produce red lacquer than violet lacquer and   0. If the lowest
possible valuation min is larger than 0, it is reasonable to assume that higher  (higher quality)
goods are more expensive and that   0.
The outside good O is produced in a competitive sector at a marginal cost of one unit of labor.
In total, the Home economy thus has to satisfy the resource constraint that domestic production
of the O and M sector and entry into the M sector do not use more than  units of Home labor.
If markets are opened to trade, manufacturing rms can sell abroad at a cost ∗
 = ,where
  1. In contrast, the outside O good can be freely traded.
2 Autarky Equilibrium
I next solve the closed economy equilibrium focusing on the two attribute - two valuation case and
assume that {f  f }, where f   f . A starting observation is that demand (5) is such that
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rms face a constant price elasticity of (1 + ) and thus charge a price of  = 1+
  = 1+
 .




 can simply be adjusted by costs.
The analysis below derives most of its results insights based on the notion that consumers
with diﬀerent valuations are diﬀerent enough so that they prefer, on average, diﬀerent types of
attributes. Formally, this notion is equivalent to the following parameter restriction.
Assumption 1: The valuation pair f  and f  satises
f     f 
Assumption 1 implies that when valuations are adjusted for costs, there exists both a group
of consumers that prefers  −  goods as well as a group that prefers  − 
ones, which is a necessary condition for an equilibrium with positive entry of both type of rms.
In the remainder of the analysis, I will only evaluate the cost-adjusted  −   and
 −   dened as
 ≡ (f  − ) and  ≡ (f  − ) 
where by Assumption 1   0  .
It is noteworthy that even with this assumption, the described preferences also comprise the
case of vertical diﬀerentiation: when f   0, all consumers value higher attribute goods and
one can speak of good "quality" as in Flam and Helpman (1987), Auer and Chaney (2009),
or Fajgelbaum et al. (2009). The fact that f   0 but   0 merely implies that although
consumers agree on the ranking of goods, they diﬀer in their ranking of price-good pairs since for
some consumers, the increase in quality is not worth the increase in price. If, on the contrary,
f   0, the analysis is about product characteristics such as good color that are not strictly
preferred by all consumers.
I denote the fraction of the population that has a valuation draw of  = f  by   [01].
Also, let  denote the total number of active rms in the industry and let  denote the fraction










 () = [ ( + (1 − ))]
−1 and
 () = [ ( + (1 − ))]
−1 
are the ideal price indices for the two groups of consumers. Since valuations are separating,
  , and  −  rms sell more to  −  consumers than do  −
 rms. Similarly,    and  rms sell more to  −  consumers.
Sales to each group are proportional to the number of consumers (there are   − 
consumers) and increasing in the ideal price indices  () and  ().
Given constant markup-pricing, rm prots are proportional to revenue. In the closed econ-
omy, this revenue depends on the distribution of consumer valuations. For any given attribute,
a higher proportion of  −  consumers implies a larger market size for  − 
rms.
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In the existing literature that is based on Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), due to the constant
elasticity demand structure, entry of new competitors hurts the sales of all existing rms in the
same proportion. In the preferences at hand, the eﬀect of such an increase in competition on
a rm’s sales is diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of rms. The revenue (8) of a rm reacts more

















¯ ¯ ¯. The latter feature implies that industries are
partially segmented: for example, the sales of BMW depend much more on the product strategy
of Mercedes rather than on the one of Toyota, which caters to a slightly diﬀerent set of consumers.
Similarly, Armani’s sales depend more on the success of the latest collections by Prada than they
do depend on the success of the collections by Benetton.
With demand being pinned down, it is straightforward to derive entry in the closed economy.
Denoting the value that a variable takes in the autarky steady state by an  superscript, the
following holds.
Proposition 2 (Autarky Equilibrium) Denote by  the autarky equilibrium number of rms
and by 
  [01] the autarky equilibrium fraction of entrepreneurs producing the  − 







0 if    −
−
1 if    −
−

−  − (1 − ) 
− otherwise
 (9)
Proof. Since rms are free to enter with an  or the  good, an equilibrium with positive
entry of both types of rms requires that the ow of revenues are equal for both  − and
 −  rms, it has to be true that
Π() = Π() (10)
where Π() and Π() are given by (8). Reformulating (10) as the diﬀerence in sales to  −




 + (1 − ) =
 − 
 + (1 − ) (11)
Since   , the LHS of (11) is increasing in relative entry of H rms . Since
   the RHS is decreasing in . Thus,  is uniquely determined.  is pinned
down by the free entry condition  = 
.
It is noteworthy that in general equilibrium, as long as 
[01], 
 is increasing in the
number of  − consumers (


  0) and also that 
 is increasing in both valuations






  0). Furthermore, denoting the autarky equilibrium ideal price indices















7Note that in the preferences developed below — much in contrast to the ones that are used by Krugman (1980)
— complete specialization in autarky may occur also if there are nontrivial masses of both types of consumers in
both Home and Foreign.
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where  ≡  −  0. The fact that the toughness of competition is linear
in  and (1 − ) respectively is a direct consequence of the fact that rms can decide with
what kind of product to enter the industry. Therefore, a higher  has to be oﬀset exactly by an
increase in  so that rms with diﬀerent attributes operate at the same level of prots, i.e. in
the closed economy, the level of competition for − and − consumers is proportional
to the number of customers  respectively (1 − ).
Summarizing, the equilibrium in the closed economy has the following properties. First, a
necessary condition for an equilibrium featuring both kinds of rms is that there exists both
a group of consumers that prefers  goods as well as a group that prefers  goods. Second,
in an equilibrium featuring positive entry of both types of rms, the fraction of  − 
rms is increasing in the number of  −  consumers. The fraction of such rms is also
increasing in  and , since an increase in either valuation leads to higher relative expenditures
on  −  goods. Third, in equilibrium, owing to the free entry condition, all rms have
the same revenue.
3 Tastes and Trade Liberalization Between Symmetric Countries
I next examine the impact of a one-time trade liberalization between two countries that diﬀer in
the fraction of − and  −  consumers.8
This section focuses on a special case of the model with equally sized countries ( = ∗)
symmetric preference parameters ( =    = ), and a symmetric distribution
of preferences  = 1 − ∗
  05. Assuming that countries are each other’s "mirror images" is
convenient to highlight the mechanisms at work because it implies that either both or none of the
countries specialize completely, whereas with asymmetric countries also either Home of Foreign
might specialize completely. I extend the analysis to the case of asymmetric countries, asymmetric
preference parameters, and also allow for trade with the rest of the world in the next section 4.
International trade is subject to "iceberg" transportation costs   1. Since there are no xed
costs to access a foreign market all rms export.
The main insights are best explained adopting the following notation. Denote by Π () the
domestic revenue of a Home rm of type  and by Π∗ () the domestic revenue of a Foreign.
Denoting the value that a variable takes in the equilibrium with open market by a  superscript,
the following holds
Π () ≡ 

 ()




As in the closed economy (see (8)), domestic revenue of a Home rm is equal to the sales to 
domestic  −  and (1 − )  −  consumers. With trade, however, the set
of competitors — and hence  () and  () — now includes foreign rms. The ideal price





































8Throughout the analysis, the distributions of consumer valuations in Home and Foreign are assumed to be
diﬀerent for exogenous reasons. Atkin (2009) shows how such taste diﬀerences can be an equilibrium outcome of
a model featuring habit formation and comparative advantage. I here assume that such diﬀerences in tastes are
present for exogenous reasons, thus enabling me to highlight the pure eﬀect of taste heterogeneity rather than the
interplay of comparative advantage and endogenously acquired taste diﬀerences in Atkin’s work.
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The symmetric conditions hold in Foreign.
How high is each rm’s export revenue? Firms charge constant markups and production costs
are the same across countries; thus, in the Foreign market, rms from Home charge a price that is
 times as high as the price of Foreign rms. With the demand elasticity being equal to -( + 1),
each Home rm thus has export revenue that equals a fraction −  1 of the domestic sales of a
Foreign rm producing the same attribute output, implying that export revenue per Home rm
of type  is equal to −Π∗ ().
With this easy relation between domestic revenue of a Foreign rm and the export revenue of
a Home rm in mind, it is straightforward to show how the interplay of the free attribute-entry
conditions in Home and Foreign pins down the relative level of competition for − compared to
 −  producers.
Lemma 1 (Relative Competition and Liberalization) Assume that Home and Foreign are




(1 + −) () if   Θ





(1 + −) ()if   Θ
( + −) 
(17)
where   Θ ≡
³










to the parameter region where countries are not completely specialized.
Proof. Consider rst the case of incomplete specialization. Since all rms export, face a
constant elasticity of demand, and are subject to iceberg transportation costs, the export revenue
of a Home rm is equal to −Π∗ () so that total revenue of a home rm is equal to Π() +
−Π∗ (). Similarly, the total revenue of a Foreign rm equals −Π() + Π∗ (). With
constant markups, an equilibrium without complete specialization requires that the revenue of an
 −  and an  −  rm are equal in Home and in Foreign so that
Π () + −Π∗ () = −Π () + Π∗ () (18)
Π () + −Π∗ () = −Π () + Π∗ (). (19)
(19) and (18) can be reduced to Π() = Π() and Π∗ () = Π∗ (). Recalling the denitions





















Last, noting that prots equal a fraction 1 of revenue, free entry implies Π ()+−Π∗ () =
, which yields (16) and (17) for the case of complete specialization.
Second, consider the case of complete specialization. With   05  ∗
, there are only  −
 rms at Home and only  −  rms in Foreign. The free entry condition still
holds (although Π∗ () and Π () are hypothetical concepts since no such rms exist) so that
Π () + −Π∗ () =  and −Π () + Π∗ () = 
Since 
 = ∗
 = 0 the four ideal price indices simplify to
 ()
− =  + −∗ and  ()
− =  + −∗,
∗ ()
− = − + ∗ and ∗ ()
− = − + ∗
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thus yielding the second case of (16) and (17).
The most important implication of Lemma 1 is that under incomplete specialization, the
distribution of tastes abroad has no impact on the relative toughness of competition for rms of
type  and . Comparison of the ideal prices indices in the autarky equilibrium (see (12)) to
the ones prevailing under trade (see (16) and (17)) reveals that
 () () =  () ()
− =
¡
1 + −¢−1 (20)
The underlying intuition for this result is best highlighted in a two-step argument. The rst
step of this argument is that any equilibrium with incomplete specialization can only arise if it is
true that in both markets, both types of rms have the exact same revenue. Since markets are
separated by trade costs, the Home market is relatively more important for Home rms, while
the Foreign market is relatively more important for Foreign rms.
With this in mind, could it ever be the case that  −  producers are somewhat
more protable than  −  producers in Home, while the reverse is true in Foreign? For
example, lets denote this diﬀerence in domestic sales at home between a  −  rm and
a − rm by  ( = Π ()−Π ()). Due to the existence of transportation costs,
the Home market matters relatively less than the domestic market and the free attribute entry
condition in Home requires that the oﬀsetting advantage for  −  rms in Foreign must
be larger than the advantage for  −  rms at i.e. that  + −∗ = 0. However,
dening the analogue diﬀerence in Foreign by ∗ (∗ = Π∗ () − Π∗ ()), the free attribute
entry condition in Foreign requires that − + ∗ = 0. Since the free entry condition in Home
requires −∗   while the one in Foreign implies that −∗   only  = ∗ = 0 can satisfy
both free attribute-entry conditions.
The second step of the intuition underlying Lemma 1 is that since domestic revenue is equalized
across countries, the domestic industry composition must adjust such as to oﬀset the mismatch
between the composition of imports and domestic tastes exactly, leaving the relative ideal price
indices undistorted by trade. The non-specialization condition under trade Π () = Π ()
is the exact same one as the free entry condition Π () = Π () in autarky. Thus, if the
composition of imports is such that after trade liberalization, some market segments are relatively
more crowded than others, domestic entry of rms is directed towards the less crowded market
segments and the entry response of domestic rms must be such that the initial imbalance is oﬀset
exactly, since only equally crowded market segments are in accordance with the non-specialization
conditions (18) and (19) not being violated.
Last, for the case of complete specialization, Lemma 1 implies that trade makes competition
tougher in the market segment that the country is not specialized in, i.e. that
 () () 
¡
1 + −¢−1   () ()
−
If there were some  −  producers in autarky, they get crowded out by imports. The
domestic industry reshuﬄing towards − producers however is not strong enough (since
the country specializes completely) to oﬀset the fact that the import composition is composed
entirely of  −  goods.
After trade liberalization, the industrial structure of the two countries diverges in order to
restore the free attribute-entry conditions. Whether specialization is complete or not, the response
of domestic industry is associated with the home market eﬀect of Krugman (1980).
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Lemma 2 (Specialization and the Home Market Eﬀect) Denote Home and Foreign’s H-
attribute exports by  and ∗
 respectively. For any −  0, the economy is at least as






Moreover, Home is a net exporter of  −  manufactured goods and a net importer of
 −  manufactured goods or
 − ∗
  0 and  − ∗
  0
Proof. see Appendix
With the equilibrium industry structure solved for, it is straightforward to calculate the volume
of trade and the gains from liberalization. Before describing the latter, it noteworthy to point
out the eﬀects of liberalization in a representative agent economy (corresponding to either  =
∗
 = 1 or  = ∗
 = 0). In both these benchmarks, it is true that the volume of trade is equal
to −
1+− and that the gains from trade in relative terms satisfy
(())
(()) = (1 + −)
. With
this clear benchmark in mind, it is straightforward to highlight the impact of liberalization in the
presence of taste diﬀerences.
Proposition 3 (Taste Diﬀerences and the Eﬀect of Liberalization) Assume that  = 1−
∗
, ∗ = ,  = , and  =  and dene average welfare in Home by
 ( ()) ≡  ( ( = )) + (1 − ) ( ( = ))
The following holds.
- If   Θ specialization is incomplete and the volume of trade is the same as in the representative
agent economy. Moreover, the welfare gains from trade occur to all groups equi-proprotionally and
in the same percentage as in the representative agent economy. That is







 ( ( = ))
 ( ( = ))
=
 ( ( = ))
 ( ( = ))
=
¡
1 + −¢ .
- If   Θ, specialization is complete and the volume of trade smaller than in the representative
agent economy. Moreover, the welfare gains from trade are group-specic and at Home, the
relatively smaller group  =  gains relatively the most from trade. The average welfare gains
from trade are smaller than in the representative agent economy. That is













 ( ( = ))
 ( ( = ))

¡




 ( ( = ))
 ( ( = ))
 1
Proof. First, consider total trade volume, which can be expressed as the sum of − and
 −  imports  = 
 + 
. For the case of incomplete specialization, noting that also
















If, instead, specialization is complete, 
 = 1, 













Where the ideal price indices in Foreign under specialization include  − producers
from Home and   −  producers from Foreign.
Second, consider the welfare eﬀect of liberalization. Corollary 1 relates group-specic welfare to
ideal price indices. Consequently, also the relative welfare gains depend exclusively on relative
price indices before and after liberalization.
 ( ( = ))







 ( ( = ))






Solving for the relative price indices under trade yields
 ( ( = ))












 ( ( = ))































It is straightforward to check that these expressions satisfy the stated inequalities.
The main takeaway from Proposition 3 is that under incomplete specialization, taste hetero-
geneity does give rise to eﬀects of liberalization that are the same as in a representative agent
framework. In addition, taste heterogeneity may matter only little even if countries in specialize




1+− i.e. when parameters are
such that specialization is complete but only marginally so, the volume of trade and the welfare
gains from trade are still equal to the one prevailing in a representative agent framework. When
 is higher, the volume of trade is decreasing in the degree of across country taste heterogeneity
and welfare gains are group-specic.
Why is complete specialization associated with low trade volume? Specialization at Home
only happens if Π ()  Π () so that
no Home rm nds it protable to enter as a − producer. But Foreign is specialized
in exactly this market segment and each foreign rm exports −Π () which is smaller than
what they a Foreign H-type producer would export; tastes are so diﬀerent across countries that
each other’s production is simply not "appropriate" for the export market.
Corollary 1 implies that the ideal price index of each type of consumer can be mapped one-
to-one into welfare changes. Proposition 3 thus implies that when countries are completely spe-
cialized, it is the relatively smaller group of consumers that gains relatively more from trade at
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the moment of trade liberalization. This result if intuitive: if markets are opened to trade, a
French consumer with a preference for beer suddenly gains access to many German beer varieties.
In contrast, a French consumer with a preference for wine gains relatively little, since Germany
oﬀers few of these varieties compared to the French industry.9
For the case of incomplete specialization, however, equilibrium trade ows are not aﬀected by
the underlying taste diﬀerences across nations. Since the import competition is biased towards one
sector, the domestic industry concentrates into the other sector. With equally sized countries, this







−, hence implying that exports and
domestic revenue per rm are the same for − and  −  rms. Hence, the distribution
of tastes abroad does not matter for the volume of trade.
4 Asymmetric Countries: A Generalization
The previous section has demonstrated a peculiar result: domestic industry composition adjusts to
exactly counteract the mismatch between the attribute composition of imports and the domestic
distribution of tastes.
The latter result, however, has been derived based on the very strong assumption of perfectly
symmetric countries. I next generalize this analysis, hence yielding the main nding of the paper
that there is a nontrivial parameter region in which across-country taste diﬀerences are of no
consequences for the eﬀect that trade liberalization has. These generalizations include asymmetric
preferences ( 6=  and  6= , and  and ∗
 being free parameters), asymmetric
entry costs ( 6= ), varying country size, and I also analyze the 3-country case. In particular
the latter introduction of the rest of the world is of importance, since it introduces an asymmetry
in the degree to which trade liberalization aﬀects the country’s industry structure.10
The following proposition summarizes the importance of across-country taste diﬀerences for
the eﬀects of trade liberalization.
Proposition 4 (Invariance of Relative Ideal Price Indices to Trade) Assume that the world
consists of 3 countries 12 and 3 that are separated by bilateral transportation costs 12, 13 and













 ( ( = ))
 ( ( = ))
=
 ( ( = ))
 ( ( = ))
= ()

9This notion of the "appropriateness" of the domestic industry relates well to the notion of appropriate technology
in the endogenous growth literature. For example, Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) show how even when technology
is freely adoptable, skill scarce countries may be less productive because technologies can be adapted to the skill
endowment of rich nations and are can only be used sub-optimally in poor nations. In this paper each country
develops an industry that is suited best to the tastes of the local consumer. The country’s export bundle is thus
inappropriate for the taste distribution of Foreign consumers.
10A generalization I do not analyze in this paper is the one where transportation costs are sector specic, i.e.
 = . As Hanson and Xiang (2004) have documented, such asymmetry gives rise to a home market eﬀect where
larger economies (or, in a multi-country world those countries that are close to economic activity) specialize into
producing low transportation goods.
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Proof. For  = 12 and 3 dene the "domestic revenue" in each country as Π in the
same way as for the two country case in (13). Denoting the xed entry cost is attribute-specic
by  (), the free entry conditions in the three countries are thus
Π1 () + −
12Π2 () + −
13Π3 () = 
−
12Π1 () + Π2 () + −
23Π3 () =  ()
−
13Π1 () + −
23Π2 () + Π3 () =  ()
solving to a relation
Π () =  ()
where  is the country’s multilateral resistance as dened above. Next, recall the denition of


















− = Π ()
Together, this uniquely solves for the ideal price indices  ()
− =  ()
− , which
satises the above-state equalities. The statements about welfare then derive from Corollary 1.
The underlying parameter conditions for incomplete specialization are derived in the appendix.
The main intuition of Proposition is that trade may aﬀect diﬀerent countries diﬀerentially, but
that in an non-specialized equilibrium, it must always be true that trade leave relative revenue






Π(). From this, it follows that also the volume
of trade is unaﬀected by taste heterogeneity.
Corollary 2 (The Volume of Trade Between Asymmetric Countries) Assume that para-
meters are such that no country specializes completely. Then, the volume of country 1’s exports
is unaﬀected by the distribution of tastes in either country 1, 2, or 3 and equal to















































12 2 + −
13 3¢
Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 2 documents that Linder’s (1961) hypothesis neglects an important insight about
how trade aﬀects a nation’s industrial structure. The key insight that demand for imports is not
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determined by preferences alone, but also, by how well these preferences are served by the domestic
industry. His hypothesis hinges on the (intuitive) notion that low domestic taste for an attribute
is associated with a low volume of imports of goods embodying this attribute. This insight indeed
holds if industry structure did not respond to tastes. However, in general equilibrium, the country
in question looses rms that produce the type of good for which domestic demand is low, and
thus the country becomes a net importer of the good. In general equilibrium, a low taste for an
attribute is thus associated with a large amount of imports embodying the attribute.
Finally, the most important consequence of Proposition 4 and the associated corollary 2 regards
the welfare eﬀects of liberalization. Opening markets to trade does not aﬀect the relative welfare
of − and  −  consumers at Home: although the group which is relatively smaller
gains from having access to a large set of Home rms that produce a tting good, this is exactly
oﬀset by the exit of domestic rms from this sector.11
Proposition 4 and the associated Corollary 2 document the main result of this paper. They
demonstrate that across-country taste heterogeneity and departures from the representative agent
framework may matter much less for the eﬀects of trade liberalization than a supercial intuition
suggests.
5 The Static Impact of Trade Liberalization
Before concluding, I also analyze the short run impact of trade since it gives rise to another case
when taste heterogeneity matters for trade. I examine the short run impact of an unanticipated
trade liberalization when the industry structure is still determined by autarky demand conditions.
The direct relevance of this case lies in the fact that rms generally take more time to exit and
enter an industry than to start exporting and, that therefore, the direction and volume of, as
well as the welfare gains from, trade are dependent on the composition of industry in autarky. In
addition, the analysis of the current section is also of use since some of the developed intuitions
hold true in general equilibrium when countries are dissimilar and specialize completely.
The analysis unveils two facts: rst, consumption is home-biased in the sense that trade volume
is lower than what would be expected on the basis of transportation costs and the elasticity of
demand. At the moment of opening markets to trade, each country’s industry is optimized for the
tastes of domestic consumers. The typical domestic exporter will, therefore, on average sell less on
the export market than would be expected for a given level of trade costs since the typical Home
consumer is diﬀerent than what the industry is optimized for: while the few German producers
of fuel-eﬃcient cars experience high demand in France, this is more than oﬀset by the many
producers of fast cars that experience low demand in France. Overall, the volume of trade is
small since the German industry, which is optimized for the fast-car loving German consumer, is
inappropriate for the average French consumer, who is characterized by a love for fuel eﬃciency.
I analyze how liberalization impacts the economy in the short run if the two countries diﬀer
in the fraction of − and  −  consumers and contrast this to the static eﬀects of
liberalization without such taste heterogeneity, where the economy resembles the one in Krugman
(1980). I also allow for the countries to diﬀer in size  and ∗.
11The welfare gains from trade in the model of this paper are also comparable to the ones in the literature
on rm heterogeneity. Arkolakis et al. (2009) evaluate the welfare eﬀects of trade for several such models with
heterogeneous rms, demonstrating that one can calculate the gains from trade on the basis of knowing only the
share of expenditure on domestic goods and the elasticity of demand. In this paper, the same holds true in the long
run equilibrium, but not in the immediate aftermath of trade liberalization.
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At the instant of opening markets to trade, the number of rms is at its autarky level (9). Since
accessing the export market is not subject to any xed cost, all rms export and there are 

 −  producers exporting from Home to Foreign and ∗∗
  −  producers
exporting from Home to Foreign. Each Home  −  rm sells to ∗
∗  − 
consumers and to (1 − ∗
)∗  −  consumers in Foreign. Denoting the values that
variables take immediately at the moment of opening to trade by  and ∗ superscripts, the
aggregate volume of  −  exports (denoted by 

























In each country, the price indices now include the import competition. Since all rms export,
Home’s exports are more  −  intensive than is the domestic production in Foreign.
Trade, therefore, intensies competition more in the sector where Foreign has relatively fewer
consumers.




 ]01[. When opening markets to trade, competition in Home intensies more in
the  −  segment of the industry than in the  −  segment, while competition
in Foreign intensies more in the  −  segment of the industry than the  − 













Proof. Since accessing the export market is free, all rms export. With entry given by the









































 which satisfy the stated inequalities.
Corollary 1 implies that the ideal price index of each type of consumer can be mapped one-to-
one into welfare changes. Lemma 3 thus implies that when countries diﬀer in their distributions
of tastes, it is the relatively smaller group of consumers that gains relatively more from trade
at the moment of trade liberalization. This result if intuitive: if markets are opened to trade, a
French consumer with a preference for large cars suddenly gains access to many German large car
varieties. In contrast, a French consumer with a preference for small and fuel eﬃcient cars gains
relatively little, since Germany oﬀers few of these varieties compared to the French industry.
What is the direction of trade in the short run after liberalization? The following proposition
summarizes the prevailing patterns of trade.
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Proposition 5 (Within- and Across-Industry Home Market Eﬀects) Assume that para-
meters are such that 
∗
 ]01[. At the moment after trade liberalization, if  = ∗, Home
is a net exporter of  −  goods iﬀ   ∗
. If  6= ∗ Home’s manufacturing exports
contain a larger fraction of  −  goods than do Foreign’s exports, but Home can be a
net-importer of such goods if ∗  . If ∗
 = , Home is a net exporter of the M good 
  ∗.
Proof. see Appendix
Proposition 5 presents two home market eﬀects. In models following Krugman (1980), a
country with a larger home market for certain types of goods has more entry of rms producing
for the domestic market. Thus, with open markets, this nation is a net exporter of industrial
output.12
The model also includes Krugman’s (1991) aggregate home market eﬀect as a special case
when Home and Foreign share the distribution of consumer tastes.13 For the strength of the
home bias, the share of − and  −  consumers is not important, since the returns
to scale are equally strong in the  and  segment of the market. Moreover, as I demonstrate
in the appendix, the model also predicts that net exports of the manufacturing M good can be
nonzero even in the case of equal country sizes. In this case, the direction of net exports is the
following: if  +∗
  1, i.e., if the global market for the type of good that Home’s exports are
concentrated in is large, Home is a net importer of manufacturing goods. If  + ∗
  1 there
are in more  − consumers than − consumers in the world (since  = ∗)
and accordingly, there are also more  −  rms in the world than  −  good
ones. Global competition is thus tougher in the  segment of the industry, which happens to
be the segment were Home’s exports are concentrated in. Similarly, competition is less tough in
the market segment were Home exports are concentrated in. Thus, Home’s overall exports are
smaller than its imports from Home if its exports tend to be concentrated in the more competitive
industry, which is the case if  + ∗
  1.
Lemma 3 is also indicative of why diﬀerences in the distribution of tastes across Home and
Foreign reduce the short run aggregate volume of trade. The aggregate volume of Home’s exports
is equal to the number of  −  rms times exports per such rm plus the number of
 −  rms times exports per such rm. Since trade intensies competition in Foreign
relatively more in the H sector, each Home  −  exporter sells a smaller amount that
she would in an economy without product heterogeneity. In contrast, each Home L-exporter sells
a larger amount that she would in an economy without product heterogeneity.
Next, I turn to the volume of trade (measured in terms of the numeraire),
Proposition 6 (Short Run Trade Volume) Assume that parameters are such that 
∗
 ]01[.
At the moment after trade liberalization, the following holds. If ∗
 = , the volume of trade
is the same as in the absence of consumer heterogeneity and Home is a net exporter of the M
12In the model at hand, the intuition of the within-industry home market eﬀect is closely related to Hanson and
Chen’s (2004) notion of the relative across-industry home market eﬀect. The within-industry home market eﬀect
is also reminiscent of Fajgelbaum et al.’s (2009) prediction that richer countries tend to export high-quality goods
and import low-quality one’s. Fajgelbaum et al.’s model features non-homogenous preferences which result in richer
consumers tending to buy higher quality goods. Since a larger fraction of high income consumers is associated with
a larger domestic market for high quality goods, richer nations have a larger number of high quality producers.
When markets are opened to trade, richer nations thus become net exporters of high quality goods.
13As demonstrated by Davis (1998), the aggregate home market eﬀect does not necessarily arise once one allows
for the possibility that trade in the O sector is also subject to trade costs.
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good    ∗. If  6= ∗
, the volume of trade is lower than in the absence of consumer
heterogeneity and the lower the higher is | − ∗
|.
Proof. See Appendix









−∗ (1 − )(1 − ∗
)




It is easily veried that if there are no diﬀerences in the distribution of valuations in Home and
Foreign (∗
 =  = ), the volume of Home’s exports is equal to −∗
+−∗for any value of . It
is easily veried that the latter expression corresponds exactly to the volume of trade one would
observe immediately after liberalization in Krugman (1980). The latter volume is decreasing in
trade costs, increasing in the size of the domestic labor force (because a larger domestic labor force
is associated with more domestic rms) and also in the size of the Home labor force (since a larger
Home labor force consumes more). The volume of trade is less than proportionally increasing in
− since the global toughness of competition is increasing in the inverse of trade costs.
Moreover, it is also straightforward to check that for any level of ∗
, in the above equation
is indeed maximized when  = ∗
, i.e., the volume of trade is lower than in the presence
of across-country taste diﬀerences. Consider the impact of taste heterogeneity and assume that
  ∗
. With such preferences, each Home rm faces relatively more demand from −




−+∗.  −  consumers






−+∗. Compared to the benchmark
economy without product heterogeneity, there is thus one sub-sector with larger export volume
and one with smaller export volume per rm. The overall eﬀect of such product heterogeneity
on the volume of trade is still unambiguously negative on Home’s export volume, since the losses
in the large  −  segment are not fully outweighed by gains in the comparatively small
− segment. In autarky, the demand structure of the domestic industry adjusts to the
distribution of consumer valuations such that all rms have equal sales. Second, in the presence
of across-country taste diﬀerences, the Home industry is not composed proportional to the Home
distribution of tastes and consequently, imports tend to increase the toughness of competition more
in some segments than in others. Third, because Home rms tend to concentrate in precisely the
relatively tough market segments (in fact: in those segments they make tough by their exports),
their sales are low compared to the domestic rms. Thus, across country taste diﬀerences diminish
the short run volume of trade if the exporter’s industry is non-negligible in size.
In the short run, the composition of the domestic industry is thus not "appropriate" for the
average Home consumer. This notion of the "appropriateness" of the domestic industry relates
well to the notion of appropriate technology in the endogenous growth literature. For example,
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) show how even when technology is freely adoptable, skill scarce
countries may be less productive because technologies are adapted to the skill endowment of rich
nations and are can only be used sub-optimally in poor nations. In this paper, in autarky, each
country develops an industry that is suited best to the tastes of the local consumer. In the short
run after opening to trade, the country’s export bundle is inappropriate for the taste distribution
of Foreign consumers.
Summarizing, three major trade patterns arise in the short run opening markets to trade. First,
if countries are of unequal size, the Home market eﬀect applies and the larger country becomes
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the net exporter of manufactured goods, while the other country becomes the net exporter of
agricultural goods. Second, even if countries are of equal size, there can be net exports in each
segment of the industry. Third, owing to the diﬀerences in countries’ average tastes, trade volume
is lower than what one would observe in Krugman’s (1980) model. I next examine whether and
to what extent these predictions hold when the industry structure is allowed to adjust to the
changed demand patterns after a trade liberalization.
Overall, my ndings thus highlight that endogenizing how a nation’s industrial composition
responds to trade liberalization is of rst order importance for understanding trade patterns and
the welfare gains from open markets. For example, Linder’s (1961) often-cited hypothesis hinges
on the intuitive idea that a lower fraction of consumers who value a certain attribute is associated
with a lower volume of imports embodying the attribute. While the latter statement is true for a
given domestic industry structure, the reverse holds true in general equilibrium: with trade, lower
domestic valuation for an attribute is associated with an over-proportional reduction in domestic
production of goods embodying the attribute, and consequently, higher import volume of such
goods.
Modeling the dynamic response of industrial composition to trade liberalization and the sub-
sequent increase in trade volumes can also contribute to our understanding of why trade grows
very sluggish after liberalization as for example documented by see Yi (2003), Ruhl (2008), and
Hummels (2007). After such liberalization, each country’s industrial composition has to adapt,
which requires rm exit and entry and, therefore, time. It is also noteworthy that the model pre-
dicts a substantial amount of new trade due to the extensive margin. In contrast to the existing
literature, this is not driven by the trade-induced shift towards ex-ante more protable entities,
but rather, by the adaptation of a country’s industrial composition to the taste structure of a
globalized economy. Modeling the dynamic response of industrial composition to trade liberaliza-
tion and the subsequent increase in trade volumes can also contribute to our understanding of why
trade grows very sluggish after liberalization (see Yi (2003), Ruhl (2008), and Hummels (2007)).
After such liberalization, each country’s industrial composition has to adapt, which requires rm
exit and entry and, therefore, time. It is also noteworthy that the model predicts a substantial
amount of new trade due to the extensive margin (see Kehoe and Ruhl (2008)). In contrast to the
existing literature that derives from Melitz (2003), this is not driven by the trade-induced shift
towards ex-ante more protable entities, but rather, by the adaptation of a country’s industrial
composition to the taste structure of a globalized economy.14
6 Conclusion
The home market eﬀect analyzed in Krugman (1980) relates across-country taste diﬀerences to
bilateral net trade ows. Given that there is now strong empirical evidence for the home market
eﬀect and therefore, also for the existence of across-country taste diﬀerences, it is striking that
most analysis in the theory of international trade is based upon preference frameworks that assume
the existence of a globally representative consumer.
In this paper, I thus analyze how diﬀerences of tastes across countries impact the volume
of trade and the welfare gains from liberalization. The paper’s main nding is that for any
parameter region that is consistent with incomplete specialization, the class of increasing returns
14Cunat and Maﬀezzoli (2007) model a similar structural transition process in which trade-induced factor ac-
cumulation slowly transforms a country’s industrial structure, leading to a sluggish response of trade volume to
liberalization.
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models based on constantly elastic preference frameworks gives rise to a result on the invariance
of relative ideal price indices to trade that is akin to the factor price equalization theorem in the
classical theory of trade. In the latter constant returns economy analyzed by Samuelson (1949),
costless trade equates good prices and any equilibrium featuring incomplete specialization requires
that factors of production receive exactly the same reward across countries.
In the increasing returns economy analyzed in this paper, the adjustment of rm prots works
via relative rm scale across diﬀerent types of goods. Since production costs and markups are equal
across countries, an equilibrium featuring incomplete specialization requires rms of the same type
to have the same revenue in Home and Foreign. This, in turn, implies that the domestic industry
composition must adjust such as to oﬀset the mismatch between the composition of imports and
domestic tastes exactly, leaving the relative ideal price indices (which measure the "toughness"
of competition) undistorted by trade.
It is shown that therefore, both trade volume and welfare gains are entirely unaﬀected by
the distribution of foreign tastes and exactly equal to what they would be in a representative
agent framework. This, for example, implies that the recent quantications of the gains from
trade based on the representative agent framework (see Broda and Weinstein (2004), Broda et
al. (2006), and Akorlakis et al. (2008)) hold exactly even if the representative agent is not the
accurate description of underlying consumption decisions.
In this sense, the analysis of hand documents that the Linder (1961) conjecture that taste dif-
ferences between countries may impede trade only holds true under the special case that countries
are completely specialized. Linder’s (1961) often-cited hypothesis hinges on the intuitive idea that
a lower fraction of consumers who value a certain attribute is associated with a lower volume of
imports embodying the attribute. While the latter statement is true for a given domestic industry
structure, the reverse holds true in general equilibrium: with trade, lower domestic valuation for
an attribute is associated with an over-proportional reduction in domestic production of goods
embodying the attribute, and consequently, higher import volume of such goods.15
Overall, the results at hand implies that the representative agent framework is much better
approximating of the welfare as might seem on rst sight, hence supporting Krugmans (2008, p.
341) conjecture that the
“detailed pattern of trade [...] does not matter as long as aggregate measures like
the volume of trade and the welfare eﬀects of trade can be derived from the model.
In eﬀect, one had to step back from the blackboard and unfocus one’s eyes a bit, so
as to grasp the broad pattern rather than the irrelevant details.”
15I also analyze two cases where across-country taste diﬀerences impact the volume of trade and the welfare gains
from liberalization. The rst case is the one where countries specialize completely. The second case is the short
run after liberalization when industry structure has not yet reacted to the changed demand structure of the open
economy. In these cases, the instantaneous welfare gains from trade occur disproportionately to the comparatively
smaller group of consumers, since this group gains access to a comparatively large set of new imported varieties.
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7 Appendix: Proofs
Proposition 1 (reminded) Denote the demand function of a rm with attribute  and charging
price  by (). Demand is determined by









where Γ() is the beta function and  () denotes the ideal price index for all consumers with










Proof. A consumer with valuation e  buys only from the rm the rm oﬀering the cheapest per





 . Since the distribution of is continuous the probability of ties is 0.
From the rm side, (expected) demand from consumer e  with an unknown realization of  is
then equal to the probability that the rm’s draw , adjusted for the rms’ price and the match
of  and e  is the maximum of all adjusted draws. Since each consumer spends (1 − ) on the
manufacturing composite, spends it all on one variety only, sales are then equal to
















= Pr(  ln() − ln() + ( − )e  + )































and Demand from group e  can be conveniently be expressed as
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 exp[e ]). Now, one can sub-





 exp[e ]) leading to




















Since the latter part can be expressed as the CDF of a Gumbel shock, we get demand per from
a mass 1 of consumers with valuation e 











To get a rm’s total demand  (), one has to integrate over all possible valuations .
Corollary 1 (reminded). Denote the expected welfare of consumer  with  =  and income
 by  ( |). If  = 1,










where the ideal price index  () is as dened in (6) and Γ() is the gamma function.
Proof. The consumer only buys from the draw and match-adjusted cheapest rm. Dene


















Implying that the value of the Langragian multiplier, or the marginal utility with respect to









. With  normalized
to 1, the utility for a given maximum realization of ∗() + ∗() is thus












denote the cdf of
e  = 
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(1 − )









































 and shape parameter 
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Lemma 2 (reminded) (Specialization and the Home Market Eﬀect) Denoting Home and
Foreign’s H-attribute goods by  and ∗
 respectively. For any −  0, the economy is at






Moreover, Home is a net exporter of  −  manufactured goods and a net importer of
 −  manufactured goods i.e.
 − ∗
  0 and  − ∗
  0
Proof. Under incomplete specialization the ideal price indices with two types of rms equal





































, thus yielding a linear system of four equations with four unknowns ∗∗
  and 
.





 + ( − ∗
) −
1−−Λ if   Θ
1 otherwise
(24)
where Λ = 
− + 
− and  = . Home’s exports of  − 
goods are equal to the number of such exporters times the exports per rm, which, as shown


















1 + −  0.
For the case of complete specialization, ∗
 = 0 so that  − ∗
  0 is trivially true.
Proposition 3 (reminded) (Invariance of Relative Ideal Price Indices to Trade)



























































Finding the explicit solution for the underlying condition for non-specialization. This expressed
for the  levels of the attribute:
1 ()
− =  ¡
1 () + 




1 () + 
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1 () + 
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122 () + 
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Corollary 2 (reminded). The Volume of Trade Between Asymmetric Countries. As long
as no country specializes, the volume of country 1’s exports is unaﬀected by the distribution of
tastes abroad and equal to















































12 2 + −
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Proposition 5 (Short Run Within-industry Home Market Eﬀect) Assume that pa-
rameters are such that 
∗
 ]01[. At the moment after trade liberalization, if  = ∗, Home
is a net exporter of  −  goods iﬀ   ∗
. If  6= ∗ Home’s manufacturing exports
contain a larger fraction of  −  goods than do Foreign’s exports.
Proof. Home’s net exports of  −  goods are equal to the number of  − 






























= ( − (1 − ))−
(1 − ) (1 − −)
























+1 are larger than 0,  − ∗


































































































































































for   ∗

Proposition 6 (reminded) (Short Run Trade Volume) Assume that parameters are such
that 
∗
 ]01[. At the moment after trade liberalization, the following holds. If ∗
 = ,
the volume of trade is the same as in the absence of consumer heterogeneity and Home is a net
exporter of the M good    ∗. If  6= ∗
, the volume of trade is lower than in the absence
of consumer heterogeneity and decreasing in | − ∗
|.
Proof. Denote the total value of exports at the moment after opening markets to trade by
 and ∗ and the attribute specic trade ows by an additional  or  subscript. For each
type of good, the value of trade is proportional to the number of rms of each type and the sales





































−∗ (1 − )(1 − ∗
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−∗ (1 − ∗
)(1 − )























 0 if   ∗

= 0 if ∗
 = 






















+−∗ if  6= ∗


which veries the rst two claims of proposition 6 . Next, setting  = ∗
 in (26) and (25) yields
 −∗ = −∗
+−∗ − −∗
−+∗, which has the described sings depending on ∗ For the second

















)− (1 + −). The latter expression is 0 whenever +∗
 = 1, positive if +∗
  1
and  ≥ ∗
, and negative if  +∗
  1 and  ≥ ∗
. The latter sign is reversed if   ∗
.
A similar calculation for Home yields (26). Thus, if  = ∗ and  6= ∗







 0 if  + ∗
  1
= 0 if  + ∗
 = 1
 0 if  + ∗
  1

It is noteworthy that due to the presence of the O sector, wages are equal across the two countries
and thus a net trade ow in labor units is equal to a net trade ow in Dollars.
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